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[Crim. No. 6690. In Bank. Mar. 16,1961.] 
THE PEOPLE, Respondent, v. THEODORE GULLICK 
et at, Appellants. 
[1] Criminal Law - Instructions - Testimony of Accomplice.-
Where a former porter of a market admitted that he instigated 
a conspiracy to burglarize the market and aided and abetted 
the burglary by disclosing his knowledge of the market and 
its security system, the jury was not required to believe his 
further testimony that he withdrew from the conspiracy be-
fore the burglary and an assault with a deadly weapon were 
committed, and the trial eourt erred in failing to instruct the 
jury that, if it found the former porter to be an accomplice, 
his testimony should be viewed with distrust (Code Civ. Proc., 
§ 2061, subd. 4) and would require corroboration to support 
a conviction. (Pen. Code, § 1111.) 
[2] Id.-Appeal-Reversible Error-Instructions-Testimony of 
Accomplice.-In u prosecution for burglary of a market and 
assault with a deadly weapon, failure to instruct on the law of 
accomplice testimony was prejudicial where, though the as-
saulted porter identified both defendants at the trial, he 
testified that he had not seen his assailants before the burglary, 
a month later, when asked to look at "mug shots" of suspects, 
he was unable to identify his assailants,and six months after 
the burglary he was taken to police headquarters for a lineup 
and identified defendants as his assailants, after an officer 
told him they had the men who committed the crime and 
wanted him to identify them, his testimony was confused and 
[1] See Cal.Jur.2d, Trial, § 498: Am.Jur., 'Trial, § 739. 
McK:. Dig. References: [1] Crilllinal Law, § 826; [2] Criminal 
Law, § 1437(9). 
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('ontradictory, and he tl.'stificu that he was ::;c"n'd to dl'ath nt 
the time of the burglary and had blneked out ami ('oulc1 not 
remember what his Msailants wore or whether he hnd gin'!l 
their description to police oflicers; the ,jury mig-ht have dis-
rE'gardeu this tcstimony for lack of independent recollection 
and eOllvictptl 011 the te~ti\llony of an accomplice who had been 
olTered imlllunity undcr Pen. Code, § 1324. 
APPEALS from jUdgments of the Superior Court of Los 
Angeles County and from orders denying new trial. Martin 
Katz, Judge. Heyersed. 
Prosecution for assault with a deadly weapon with intent 
to commit lIlUrdCl' and for LUI'glary. Judgments of convictioll 
of assault with a deadly weapOll and first degrce burglary, 
reversed. 
Joseph M. Rosen, undl.'r appointment by the Supreme Court, . 
for Appellants. ' 
Stanley Mosk, Attorney General, and William E. James, 
Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent, 
TRAYNOR, J.-Defendants Theodore Gullick and James· 
Robert Crumbey appeal from judgment. .. of conviction entered 
on a jury verdict finding them guilty of burglary and assault . 
with a deadly weapon and from orders denying their motions 
for new trial. 
Boy's Market in Los Angeles was burglarized and James 
,V. Robinson, a porter in the market, was assaulted on the 
evening of February 15, 1959. There were two principal wit-
nesses for the prosecution, Robinson, the port('r, and William 
Grant, Jr., a confessed conspirator, who implicated defendants I 
after a promise of immunity from the district attorney. De-
fendants contend that they had no connection with the crimes. 
R<>binson testified that he was alone in the market cleaning 
up after closing hours when he was surpri!';('d by two men 
who stahbed and beat him and then tied him up. He managed 
to shuffle into the elevator, where he was found three hOlll'S 
later by poliee offieers and the viee-president of the market. 
An offieer t!'stifi('d that Robinson describ('d his as!';ailants as 
"Two male Nf'grol>s, olle five foot !':ix and one five foot SCyell, 
one wei~h('(llfiO I1IHl the other lfi2; thcy both lilul hlack hair; 
eyes, color 1111\01('\\'11 : Olle weal'illg browlI coat. and the other 
dark shirt." 
) 
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Grant had previously been a porter at the market. 'Vhen 
he was called as a witness, the trial court advised him of his 
right to refuse to answer questions teuding to incrilllinate him, 
and the district attorney then offered him illlmunity. (Pen. 
Code, § 1324.) Grant testified that it was his idea to hurglariz(· 
the mal'ket and that he deeided to "l'lI1ploy ~Ir. Crumbey or 
someone heeause I didn't know too mauy fellows around at 
the time." lIe met Crumbey to disl'uss the details of the 
burglary. Cl'Umbey said he knew another fellow by the name 
of "Buzzy." Grant testified that ~he night before the bur-
glary he and defendants drove out to "ease the store." He 
explained the security system of the market and told defend-
ants how to break in. On the afternoon of February 15, about 
three hours before the bUl'glal'~', Grant told defendants to 
"forget the whole deal." They sa id, "O.K." lIe testified 
that his next conversation with dl'f('ndants was 011 February 
18, when they told him t1lathe :-ohouhl ha\'e gone along with 
tht'm. 
Gullick testified that he did not know Crumbey until he 
met him in jail after his arrest for the burglary and assault. 
Gullick denied knowing Grant, other than haying shined his 
shoes. He stated that his nickname was" Ted," not" Buzzy." 
It was stipulated that if called, Officer Jobe would testify 
that he arrested Gulli('k, who first denied that bis name was 
"Buzzy," but then stated, "Oh, yl~S, my friends call me Buzz~', 
but you upset me. That is why I didn't tell you who I was." 
It was also stipulated that on the day Graut testified that he 
spoke to Gullick, Gullick was in jail on an unrelated charge. 
Crumbey admitted knowing Grant, who "had ideas I was 
fooling' around with his wife." 
Defendants contend that the trial comt erred in failing to 
instruct the jury on the law of accomplices and the necessity 
of corroboration of acromplice trstimony. All their instruc-
tions relating to the definition of an accomplice, accomplice 
testimony, and the necessity of corroboration of surh testimony 
were refused. 
[1] There is evidence that Grant was an ae(!omplice. He 
admitted that he instigated thc (·onspirac·y anrl aided and 
abetted the burglary by disclosing his lmowJeclgc of lhe market 
and its security system. The jmy was not ref(nired to beli('ve 
his fnrthel' tp.stimony that hI' withclrew from thc conspirary 
IIl'for(' the crimes were ('OJIIlllitte,l.(See Cocle Civ. Proe., 
§ 1847; P('ople v. Cowall. :18 Cal.App.2cl 2:11, 242 [101 P.2c\ 
125].) The trial court ther('forc erred in failing to instruct 
) 
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the jury that if it found Grant to be all accomplice, his testi-
mony should be viewed with distrust (Code Civ. Proc., § 2061, 
subd. 4) and would require corroboration to support a con-
viction. (Pen. Code, § 1111.) 
[2] The attorney general contends, however, that Robin-
son's identification of defendants fully supports their con-
viction and that therefore the failure to instruct on the law 
of accomplice testimony was not prejudicial. It is true that 
Robinson identified both defendants at the trial. His testi-
mony, however, casts considerable doubt on the probative 
value of his identifications. He testified that he had not seen 
his assailants before the night of the burglary. A month later, 
when asked to look at "mug shots" of suspects, he was unable 
to identify his assailants. He testified, "Several pictures 
looked like them, you know, you can't .... " Six months after 
the burglary he was taken to police headquarters for a lineup 
and identified defendants as his assailants. He testified, how-
ever, that at that time an officer told him that they had the 
men who committed the crime and wanted him to identify 
them. Hiil testimony was confused and contradictory. He 
testified that there were two lineups about four minutes apart 
and that there were only three colored men in the lineup, 
defendants and Grant. He knew Grant, having worked with 
him at the market. He later testified that there was a fourth 
Negro in the lineup, but that he was a "young kid," much 
YOWlger than the others in the lineup. On redirect examina-
tion he testified that he only looked at two men at the police 
station. He also testified that he was scared to death at the 
time of the burglary and had blacked out and could not re-
member what his assailants wore or whether he had given their 
description to the police officers. He had deilcribcd them at 
the time, however, as being "five foot six and five foot seven." 
Crumbey is 6 feet tall, and Gullick's height doeil not appear. 
From a review of the entire record we have concluded that 
it is reasonably probable that the jury concludfd that Robinson 
had no independent recollection of the identity of his assail-
ants and identified defendants at the trial solely because the 
officers had told him that they had the men who committed 
the crime and then prl'sented defendants to him. If so, Grant's 
testimony was crucial, and instructions on accomplice testi-
mony essential. Under these circumstances it is "reasonably 
probable that a result more favorable" to defendants" would 
have been reached in the absence of the error," and accord-
) 
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ingly the error is prejudical. (People v. Watson, 46 Cal.2d 
818,836 [299 P.2d 243].) 
The judgments and the orders denying the motions for 
new trial are reversed. 
Gibson, C. J., Peters, J., White, J., and Dooling, J., con-
curred. 
SCHAUER, J., Dissenting.-In reversing the judgments 
of conviction entered on the jury's v.llrdicts of guilty, the 
majority hold that the evidence would"support a finding that 
William Grant was an accompli('e of defendants, and hence 
that the trial court erred in refusing to instruct on the law 
of accomplices and on the necessity that accomplice testimony 
be viewed with distrust and be corroborated. The majority 
refer only to portions of the evidence;1 but, according to their 
opinion, "~'rom a review of the entire record," they deter-
mine "that it is reasonably probable that the jury concluded 
that [James W. Robinson, the principal prosecution witness, 
eyewitness and victim of the assault] had no independent 
recollection of the identity of his assailants and identified 
defendants at the trial solely because the officers had told 
him that they had the men who committed the crime and then 
presented defendants to him. If so, Grant's testimony was 
crucial, and instructions on accomplice testimony essentiaL" 
I agree that the failure to give the subject instructions was 
error; I cannot agree, however, that there is any substantial 
basis for concluding that such error was prejudicial. The 
majority give only lip service to the standard for reversal 
(under Cal. Const., art. VI, § 41;2) articulated in People v. 
Watslm (1956), 46 Cal.2d 818, 836 [12] [299 P.2d 243]: 
"That a 'miscarriage of justice' should be declared only when 
the court, 'after an examination of the entire cause, including 
the evidence,' is of the' opinion' that it is reasonably probable 
that a result more favorable to the appealing party would 
have been reached in the absence of the error." It is my 
opinion that if the majority would actually be guided by this 
rule and apply it to a fair statement of the facts in this case 
the jUdgments appealed from would be affirmed. 
The history of this case in the trial court is brielly as fol-
lows: Defendants were tried before a jUry on charges of 
assault with a deadly weapon with intent to commit murder, 
'Significant aspects of the record, not mentioned in the majority 
opinion, are hereinafter related. 
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burglary, and kidnaping for the purposc of robbery. Robin-
son, the above mentioned victim of the assault, testified to 
defendants' appearance at night in the market where Robinson 
was employed, to defcndant Gullick's attack with a knife, de-
fendants' binding Robinson with rope, and moving him about 
the store, and Robinson's concealing himself in the elevator. 
William Grant, called as a corroborating witness, testified to 
his asserted initiation of the criminal plan and his likewise 
asserted withdrawal from it. The rear door of the market had 
been forcibly broken open; papers and empty money bags 
were strewn about the cashier's cage; and an audit disclosed 
that $849 in rolled coins had been stolen from the market. 
The jury discriminatingly found that each defendant was 
not guilty of assault with intent to commit murder but was 
guilty of assault with a deadly weapon, that each defendant 
was guilty of burglary of the first degree, and that each 
defendant was not guilty of the alleged kidnaping. 
It has frequently been held that "there is no prejudicial 
error [in failing to instruct on accomplice testimony] where 
the record contains ample evidence to support the jUdgment 
without consideration of the testimony of the· accomplice" 
(People v. Dat'is (1954), 43 Ca1.2d 661, 674 [20] [276 P.2d 
801], and Ca8es there cited; People v. Wade (1959), 169 Cal. 
App.2d 554, 557 [2] [337 P.2d 502] ; and cf. People v. Oars-
well (1959), 51 Ca1.2d 602, 606 [5] [335 P.2d 99]). The 
record before us admits of no rational basis for doubting that 
the crimes of which defendants stand convicted (assault with 
a deadly weapon upon the person of Robinson and burglary, 
in the first degree, of the Boy's Market) were committed. 
Neither is there any reasonable basis, as I read the record, for 
an appellate court to conclnde that Robinson, although he 
told the truth when he testified that he had been assaulted 
and the market burglarized, probably perjured himself or 
was mistaken when he testified positively not only that he 
recognized the defendants as the perpetrators of the crimes 
but related in detail the acts of each. Direct identification 
by one eyewitness is, of course, ample evidence to connect a 
defendant with the crimes with which he is charged. (People 
v. Whitson (1944),25 Ca1.2d 593, 600-602 [I, 2], 604 [5, 7] 
[154 P.2d 867].) 
The record shows that at the trial Mr. Robinson directly 
and positively identified defendants as his assailants. After 
stating that he observed two men in the market shortly after 
9 p. m. on the night in question, Robinson testified as follows: 
$5 C.2d-l' 
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"Q. Did they say anything to you T A. Yes, they say, 'We 
came in here to rob the store and we got orders to kill you.' 
"Q. Are ~they' the two defendants here' A. Yes, sir. 
"Q. Who spoke to you first T A. The first fellow there. 
"Q. This fellow with the light shirt! A. Yes. 
"MR. MADDEN [deputy district attorney]: May we have 
his nameT 
"MR. PrSER [defendants' counsel] : Gullick ...• 
"Q. The other defendant you say was by the place where 
the empty bottles were kept; that ,is, the defendant Crumbey 
here with the red shirt on T A. Yes . ... 
"Q. After they spoke to you, then what happened' A. He 
went at me with a knife and I grabbed him. 
"Q. Who did thatT A. The fellow with the light shirt. 
"Q. Mr. Gullick did that Y A. Yes .... 
"Q. Did Mr. Crulllbey have a knife also or notT A. The 
one in red; no, I didn't see one on him. . . . 
"Q. When you got back to the point marked B [i.e., the 
back of the store], what happened there, if anything? A. They 
tied me up and I had my keys to the front door, and so they 
asked me what those keys were for, and I said, 'Those keys 
are for the front door.' 
"Q. Where did you have those keys' A. I had those keys 
in my pocket. 
"Q. Did one of these two defendants reach in your pocket 
and get the keys' A. No, they heard me and said, 'Give 
them to us.' 
"Q. Who did you hand the keys to T A. The dark fellow. 
"MR. MADDEN: Indicating Mr. Gullick. THE WITNESS: 
Yes .... 
, 'Q. By MR. MADDEN': The two men you saw in the store, 
are you certain they are the two defendants hereT A. Yes, 
they are the two defendants there." 
The majority acknowledge (ante, p. 543) that "Robinson 
identified both defendants at the trial," but dismiss this fact 
with the statement that "His testimony, however, casts con-
siderable doubt on the probative value of his identifications." 
In my opinion, none of the asserted weaknesses or contradic-
tions which the majority then set forth justifies their con-
clusion (ante, p. 543) that "it is reasonably probable that 
the jury concluded that Robinson had no independent recol-
lection of the identity of his assailants .... " 
The majority first assert that when Robinson was asked to 
look at "mug shots" of suspects, "he was unable to identify 
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his assailants." But the majority fail to melltion that when 
subsequently asked, "Did you see any of the defenuants' 
[photographs] in there 1" R{)billson answered, "No' '-allu i 
that there is no testimony 01' other evidence whatsoever that 
any photographs of defendants were in fact among those 
shown t~ the witness. It is therefore improper to imply, as do 
the majority, that photographs of defendants were shown to 
Robinson and that he failed to recognize them. 
The majority next emphasizc testimony that prior to letting 
Robinson view a lineup of suspects a police officer told him 
that they "had the men who committed the crime," and 
testimony that only three or four Negroes (including defend-
ants and Grant) were then shown to the witness. 'While an 
identification made under such circumstances may perhaps 
be less reliable than one might prefer, it does not necessarily 
follow that Robinson failed to recognize defendants as his 
assailants when they were brought before him or that he had 
"no independent recollection" of the identity of his assailants. 
The majority make much of their conclusion (ante, p. 543) 
that R{)binson's testimony concerning the lineups "was con-
fused and contradictory." It should be pointed out, however, i 
that the questions asked of him by defendant's counsel were 
themselves confused and contradictory, and could scarcely 
have been answered in a coherent manner even by a witness 
with a far better educational background than Robinson's.2 
His failure to remember, a month after the lineup, the exact 
number of colored persons other than defendants among 
those shown to him is, in any event, irrelevant to the question 
of whether at the time of the lineup he had an "independent 
recollection" of the identity of his assailants. The statement 
of the majority that" On redirect examination he testified that 
he only looked at two men at the police station" is not a fair 
summary of the effect which the trier of fact could have given 
• A sample of such questioning follows: 
"Q. They actually had the showup or lineup twice-didn't these two 
gentlemen walk through two times' A. I think so .•.. 
"Q. When you went down there, how mllny men were in the lineup 
the first time' A. I can't recall. I didn't count them. I just recall 
those two. 
"Q. There were three colored gentlemen, weren't there, the fourth 
time' A. Three or four, I don't know, Mexican, Caucasian-I don't 
know how many there was in the lineup. . .. 
"Q. The fact is, they hall two lineups and the first time in that lineup 
there were just th rce men of the colored race, is that correct! A. No, 
they had these two fellows nncl nnother fellow nnel Grant. I don't know 
whether they had more colored or not." (Italics added.) 
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that portion of Robinson's testimony. Particularly in view 
of the witness's lack of facility in either comprehending th(' 
questions of others or articulating his replies, such testimony, 
quoted in the margin,3 could be understood to mean that he 
looked at 10 or 12 men but was only looking for his two assail-
ants for the purpose of identifying them. 
Testimony of Hobinson that during the period of the assault 
he was "dumbfounded and scarell" and "I am telling you 
the truth, I blacked out, I don't know what they had on," 
could well have impressed the triet:of fact as an indication 
of the witness's utter sincerity rather than an indication of 
his inability to identify his assailants. 
The majority also 8tre;;s (mdf, p. 5-13) a discrepancy be-
tween the estimate of his assailants' height which Robinson 
gave to the police and the aetual height of defendants.' The 
point is of little importance. The estimate in question was 
made by Robinson immedintdy afl,'r his release from the 
elevator and while he was still in a weak and frightened 
condition, in an honest attempt to re'produce descriptively 
his assailants' features from his mental image of them. It 
remains true, a,> this court has said, that "Ordinarily the 
power to accurately describe human features is with most 
persons a limited power" (People v. Connelly (1925),195 Cal. 
584, 593 [1] [234 P. 374]). It is therefore not surprising, 
in the circumstances in which Robinson made his estimate, 
that there should have been some such discrepancy. 
The remaining weaknesses found by the majority in Robin-
son's testimony are equally without significance. This is not 
a case where the eyewitness caught only a fleeting glimpse of 
the faces of his assailants. Here it is undisputed that the 
witness "walked right [up] to their face" and was addressed 
by them; they grappled with him and knocked him down, 
then picked him up and took him to the back of the store 
where they tied him up; they qUf'stioned him about his keys. 
'" Q. How many mt>n altogether did they show you that eveningl 
A. Well, on the other men who were there, I guess about 10 or 12. 
"Q. Altogether you looked at 10 or 12 men 1 A. Not myself; that was 
other people, you know, picking the people out. 
"Q. How mnny people were shown to you that you were to look at! 
A. Just these two that came in on me .... 
"Q .•.. Perhaps from whnt you told us before and wl,at you teJl u~ 
now there scems to be some confusion. Altogether how many mt>n \lid 
you look at for the purpose of hkntifi('ation on the night thnt you saw 
tht>se two mell, the \lefen(1nnts, nt the stntion? A. Two." 
'As the Illnjority recognize, Gullick'~ height (10cs not appenr in th" 
record. Crumbey, who is snid to 1,e six feet tall, t('stifle'] that he w,,~ 
"taller than" the others in the lineup (including GUllick). 
) 
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thCH thrcatened to put hill! illto the rl'fl'igeratol' but were tIis-
suaded by him from'doing so; 111111 the.,' fillaliy Ilt'agog-cd him to 
thf' bakery allllll,ft him there. This Sl'['[eS of eWllts ('onslllIll'd 
at lea"t 10 to 1:i miuntes, dut"illg' whil'h time Robin,;oll hall 
ample opportullit:, to sec the fact's of his assailants Hllli to 
Hotiee their bodily 1II0n'mellts aud their \'oicf's. ~ 
'Vhen eOllfronted thereafter Ly dl'fclluallts, both at the 
lineup alld at the trial, HohillSOIl reppatedly aud UlI('(luivocally I 
idf'lltifieli tltC-1Il as the men Il'ho had attacked him on the night 
of the crime. His testimony to this efi'c-ct, quoted hereinabove, 
is supported by the undisputed fact that he had ample oppor-
tunity to observe the features of his assailants. It is unshaken 
hy defendants in any material respect, and in my view clearly 
sustains the jury's verdids "without consideration of the 
testimony of the al'l'OIuplil'e [Grantl" (People v. Davis 
(1954), supra, 4:3 Ca1.2d 661, 67-1 [20]). The presence of 
Robinson's testimony distinguishes the present case from 
such decisions as People v. Warrell (1940). 16 Cal.2d 103, 
115 [8]-116 [9] [104 P.2d 1024], ,,,h(,l'e it was conceded that 
"the only evidence in the record which way be considered as 
implicating [the defendant]" was the testimony of au accom-
plice (italics added; see also People v. Bevins (1960), 5-1 
Ca1.2d 71, 78 [SJ f:361 P.2d 776]). It follo\\'s that the ('rror 
here in failing to instruct on accomplice testimony cannot 
fairly be deemed prejudicial. 
The majority, in eOIll'luding that it is "reasonably prob-
ahle" that the jury regarded as "crucial" the testimony of 
Grant (the witness who could have been found to be an ac-
complice), appear to attach more importance to that evidence 
than the prosecuting attorney claimed for it in his argument 
to the jury. Such argument correctly summarizes Grant's 
testimony as follows: 
"There was another witn('ss, Mr. Grant, who testified that 
he was acquainted with Mr. Crumbey. Mr. Grant also testified 
he worked at the Boy's Market and was acqnaint('d with tIle 
security system they had where they tel<'pllOlle evel'~' hour, 
and in the evellt. T take it, that the ring is not madf', thrl1 
that is some iudic-ation that something is wrong' there ill the 
store. 
"He testified that he talkro with Mr. Crumlwy ahout bur-
"Robinson testified on cross-cxnminntioll that when defendants were 
asked to speak during the Iinenp h(' recognized them hy their voices 
(as well as by their appl'aran('c), Raying, "Well, nftpr I heard it, any, 
body beating you like they did mel lIon 't know, I just knew the voke.' , 
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glarizing thc Boy's Mcu'ket, t !llkeu to him 011 sever-al ol'I'HsioIlS 
about it ... at Adams and Normalldie in )11'. G nUlt's I·ar. 
[Defendant Crumbey was subsequently arrested at this eorner, 
and defendant Gullick's place of business was a bloek hom 
it.] ... 
"Later on they discussed it again, and Mr. Grant testified 
that Gullil'k [sic] told him that he would get another person to 
help him. ..• . 
"[T]here was a discussion as to what the best time would 
be to go to commit the burglary of the Boy's Market, and 
Mr. Grant told him the best time was to go after the store 
was closed. They finally decided that the burglary was to be 
committed on Sunday, the following day [February 15, 1959, 
the day on which the crimes were committed], and they were 
to get someone else to help them with it. 
"The following day,outside of the Normandie Club there 
at a bar on the corner, Mr. Grant talked with Mr. Crumbey 
about the burglary here again, .•. and the person known as 
Buzzy was introduced to Mr. Grant by Crumbey. 
"Now, Mr. Grant identifies Buzzy as being Mr. Gullick 
here. . 
"Later on, several days after the burglary, Mr. Grant again 
had a conversation with Crumbey where they told him, 'Well, 
you sllOuld llave gone along with them-' and of course, 
that means Mr. Gullick and Mr. Crumbey had already gone 
ahead and committed the burglary, and apparently there wa.t; 
some inference that they got some money; otherwise, why 
make a statement, 'You should have gone along.' 
"But befo1'l' that ... Mr. Grant had told thl'se two dc-
fl'll<1ants : .. 'Let's forget the deal,' ... and there is no 
indh'ation that Mr. Grant himsl'lf was the person who par-
til'ipat.('!l in this hurglary." 
The prosecuting attorney continued his argument as to the 
",itlll'S!; Grant as follows: "Now ~rou might say, we11, this 
person, Mr. Grant, he is 110t a particularly reliable sort of 
})(>rson. So I think that perhaps we have to look to something 
(>lse to Iwrhaps give some credence to what he might testify 
to. So, if you are somewhat suspicious, you have a certain 
amount of corroboration or suhstantiation of what he testified 
to here by what the victim, Mr. Rohinson, stated that these 
defendants stated to him -- 'Did you make your rin~T 
'When are you going to make your ring T' And he said, '10 :00 
o'clock.' ... The two def<>lluants told ~r. Rohinson, 'You 
are not going to make that ring.' 
") 
) 
Mar. 1961J PEOPLE.V. Gur.LICK 
(55 C.2d 540; 11 Ca1.Rptr. 566. 360 P.2d 82] 
551 
"'Vhoever it was who committed th<'sc burglarics had some 
lmowledge of that particular securit~ .. system, this phone eall 
arrangement. 
"Now, we have positive identification of these two men by 
the vietim, plus the faet that whoever did commit this bur-
glary knew about the phone system; and that substantiates 
to some extent what :Mr. Grant told these men as to how they 
could burglarize the store." 
Finally, I would point out that one other circumstance in 
the record of this case may tend to explain its unusual treat-
ment by the majority. The subject circumstance is not one 
which was before the trial eourt and is not one whieh, in my 
view, shou1<1 afi('ct the disposition of a cause before us. Wit-
tingly or ullwittingly, however, perhaps it does. Such cir-
cumstance developed as follows: 
Defendants were jointly represented by an attorney through-
out the proceedings in the trial court, but both served notiees 
of appeal in propria persona. Gullick requested that the Dis-
trict Court of Appeal (Second District, Division Two) ap-
point counsel to represent him on appeal. The request was 
denied. He then petitioned the District Court of Appeal for 
an order augmenting the record on appeal by including there-
in the opening statement and opening and closing arguments 
of the prosecuting attorney and the instructions given and 
refused. These matters are not part of the" normal" reeord 
on appeal. (Rules on Appeal, rule 33(a).) "If the appellant 
desires sH('h additional record he shall file with his notice of 
app<'al an application describing the material whieh he d<'sir('s 
to have included and the points on \vhich he intends to rely 
which make it proper to include it." (Rules on Appeal, 
rule 33(b).) Gullick had not done this in th(' trial conrt. 
But since his failure to obtain the initial inclusion of the 
material in the record might be excused by his lack of ('onnsel, 
he was cntitled to petition the revicwing ('ourt for augmcnta-
tion of the record. (Rules on Appeal, rule 12(a).) 
Augmentation, however, is not a mattcr of right. It is 
subject to the discretion of the appellatc court. (Kalm.1t.~ v. 
Kalm1ls (1950), 97 Cal..App.2d 74, 76-77 [217 P.2d 64].) 
The party seeking it should allege facts justifying aU:;!II1!'nta-
tion, just as the original transcript of matters additional to 
the "normal" record must be based, under rule 33, on a 
showing of good causc. The moving party should show gen-
erally what he expects the omitted matter to contain and 
how he expects to make use of such matter in the presentation 
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of his appeal. (See People v. Parkinson (1956), 139 Cal. 
App.2d 500 [293 P.2d 801].) 
Gullick in moving the District Court of Appeal to augment 
the record alleged only that the requested matter was neces· 
sary "to properly prepare and present his ... cause in and 
before the Appellate Court." That court without written 
opinion denied the motion. Gullick presented to this court a 
document entitled "Petition for the Writ of Mandamus," by 
which he asked that the District Court of Appeal, named as 
respondent, be directed to order augmentation of the record. 
This document was filed here as a petition for hearing. 
In it Gullick asserted, again in general terms, that the addi-
tional record which he sought in the District Court of Appeal 
contained "matter prejudicial to [his] substantial interest." 
In fairness to Gullick, because he was then without counsel, 
his petition might well have been denied without prejudice to 
renewal of his motion in the District Court of Appeal and 
this court might (in accord with its often followed practice) 
have asked its clerk to direct Gullick's attention to the pre-
viously mentioned prerequisites to such a motion. This course 
was not followed, however. Rather, this court, without even 
the "normal" record on appeal before it and without any 
suggestion from Gullick as to what, if any, arguments he might 
advance on appeal, granted the "petition for hearing" and 
transferred to itself the cause on appeal as to both Gullick 
and Crumbey, as well as Gullick's motion, appointed counsel 
for the defendants, and granted the motion for augmentation. 
Gullick prepared a brief in propria persona, and presented 
it to court-appointed counsel. As counsel well .says in his 
supplemental brief, the brief prepared by Gullick "appears 
to set forth the issues with reasonable clarity and is well docu-
mented." Counsel, although diligent, has been able to add 
nothing to Gullick's own presentation of his case except a 
few citations and a more professional manner. Even more 
strikingly than in the situation to which I called attention 
in People Y. Brown (1960), ante, pp. 64, 74 [9 Cal.Rptr. 
836, 357 P.2d 1072], the actions of this court appear to have 
hindered and delayed rather than furthered or expedited the 
just disposition of this cause. 
To reverse for a new trial in the circumstances here is, I 
believe, to disregard the positive admonition of article VI, 
section 4%, of the California Constitution and to work a mis-
carriage of justice directly upon the people of this state (as 
well as a waste of money) and cventually upon the defendants 
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who, on the same evidelll'e should almost certainly be again 
convicted and, after the fruitless delay and expense caused by 
the majority's action herein, finally have to expiate the judg-
ments in any event. 
I would affirm the judgments. 
McComb, J" concurred. 
Respondent's petition for a reheBlring was denied April 12, 
1961. Schauer, J., and McComb, J .• were of the opinion that 
the petition should be granted. 
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